Self-evidently, we each believe many things about a variety of subjects. Similarly, it seems equally compelling that we can also know many things about a similarly diverse range of subjects.However, upon reflection, it seems that we often uncritically assume an equivalence between the two - to believe and to know. Phrased alternatively, that which I believe is the same as that which I know to be true. Furthermore, related to these to concepts are the twin notions of doubt and certainty.
Perhaps nowhere is this more so than in regard to spiritual matters.
Carl Jung has a number of interesting and provocative quotes that challenge this equivalence.
I dislike belief in every respect, because I want to know a thing, and then I don't have to believe it if I know it. If I don't know it, it looks to me like a usurpation to say “I believe it”, or the contrary. I think one ought to have at least some more or less tangible reasons for our beliefs. One should have some knowledge at least that makes a hypothesis probable. (Jung 1973b, p. 445)
I believe only what I know. Everything else is hypothesis and beyond that I can leave a lot of things to the Unknown. They do not bother me. But they would begin to bother me, I am sure, if I felt that I ought to know about them. (Jung 1970b, p. 44)
The word belief is a difficult thing for me. I don't believe. I must have a reason for a certain hypothesis. Either I know a thing, and then I know it - I don't need to believe it. (McGuire and Hull 1977, p. 437)
Unreflecting belief, which is notoriously apt to disappear as soon as one begins thinking about it. The content of belief then comes into collision with knowledge, and it often turns out that the irrationality of the former is no match for the racionations of the latter. Belief is no adequate substitute for inner experience, and where this is absent even a strong faith which came miraculously as a gift of grace may depart equally miraculously. People call faith the true religious experience, but they do not stop to consider that actually it is a secondary phenomenon arising from the fact that something happened to us in the first place which instilled pistis into us – that is, trust and loyalty. (Jung 1964a, p.265)
Let us look at the etymology of the word "know".
It comes from the Old English word cnawan which means "to know" and from the Latin word gnoscere which similarly means "to know", which in turn comes from the Greek word ginosko and the root gno. The Greek word ginosko means "come to know", "perceive", "recognize", "understand", "give recognition to". Implicit in this is the notion of recognition, which means to "to perceive as true and real" and comes from the Latin word recognoscere, a conjunction of re "again" plus cognoscere "to know".
By way of a brief excursion, perceive, which means "to become aware of", "to know", "to discern", "to recognise" comes via the Medieval English word perceiven from the Latin word percipere which means "to lay hold of, to grasp ". The Latin word percipere is a combination of per "thoroughly or utterly" plus cipere from capere "to take ". Interestingly, the word discern, which means to "to distinguish" comes from the Latin word discernere which means "to separate from". This etymology confirms Jung's claim that consciousness 'separates and discriminates, it knows only particulars, and it sees only those that can be related to the ego' (Jung 1964a, p. 145).
Back to the word "know".
Not only does this etymology establish knowledge as a particular relationship between a subject and an object, it implicitly assumes (from the linkage with recognise) both the possibility of a prior knowing as well as a prior existing. Necessarily, this means that knowledge must be based on something a priori as well as ab extra.
Importantly, this must mean that the locus of knowing is internal to the knowing subject (ab intra) and the locus of that which is known is external to the knowing subject (ab extra). Therefore, to know is for a subject to come into a particular relationship with an external object. Interestingly, gnosis (from which we derive the word gnostic) also stems from the Greek word ginosko.
Naturally, the opposite of "to know" is "to not know", and the word we use for that is ignorance. Ignorance comes from the Latin word ignorare which means "not to know, which is a combination of in "not" and gnarus "aware, acquainted with," which in turn comes via Latin from the Greek root gno, which again is related to gnoscere which means "to know".
The brief detour through the antonym "ignorance" highlights the connection of knowing with being aware. We usually define aware as "having knowledge". The word aware comes from the Old English word gewaer which means "watchful", and is very much like the German word for aware which is gewahr, and which comes via weir from the Proto Indo-European root wer which means "to cover ". From this we can assume that to know is to perceive which is to become aware which somehow relates to something which must have previously been covered.
This links to the word discovery. Discovery comes from the Latin word discooperire which is a conjunction of dis- "opposite of" and cooperire "to cover up". Therefore, to discover something is to uncover it or to become aware of it and therefore "to know" it. Again, the a priori and ab extra nature of knowing can be observed from the etymology of not knowing.
What does Jung have to say about knowing that supports the etymological amplification of knowledge as being in a true relation to an a priori and ab extra object?
First he makes the ab extra statement that 'one cannot know something that is not distinct from oneself ' (Jung 1970b, p. 504). Second he states that knowledge consists of the 'constant adaptation of the primordial patterns of ideas that were given to us a priori' (Jung 1964a, p. 283), and that knowing is based 'upon the perceived connection between psychic events' (Jung 1969e, p. 390). Consequently, according to our Jungian approach, to know is to be in true relation to an a priori and ab extra archetype, where archetypes are the building blocks of knowledge. Importantly, archetypes are the numinous, pre-existent, inherent ordering patterns of Being, which is why Jung asserts that 'there is not a single important idea or view that does not possess historical antecedents. Ultimately they are all founded on primordial archetypal forms' (Jung 1959, p. 33).
Let us now look at the word "belief".
The word believe, which is defined as "to trust in, to have faith in, to have confidence in" comes from the Old English word belyfan, which in turn comes from the Proto Germanic word galaubjan, which means "to hold dear, love,". Belief and faith are therefore synonyms, and point to a characteristic of the subject (subjective), whereby trust or confidence is placed in a particular object.
The word faith comes from the Medieval English word feith and from the Latin word fides which is akin to fidere which means "to trust ". Interestingly, fides is "that which produces confidence or belief". Another Greek word which is translated faith is pistis which also means "that which gives confidence, that which is entrusted".
In pistis and fides, the dominant element (which is implicit) is that of an object that creates the confidence or entrusts. In other words, it implies that pistis or fides is put into us, and the implicit assumption points to that which does the putting. Either it is something that is a priori and ab extra, in which case it becomes known (knowledge) or it is a posteriori and ab intra, in which case it is believed (belief).
Having already established the fact that knowledge is based on archetypes, which are akin to eidos, what then might unreflecting faith or belief be based upon? Clearly, it must be based on archetypal images or eidolon, or the constructed objects of consciousness. The objects consciousness have their own fascination factor, created by our identification with them, as do archetypes, which have their numinosity, created by wonder. Clearly, the relationship between subject and object again becomes all important.
Let us briefly look at the word "doubt".
As Jung asserts, 'where there is belief there is doubt, and the fiercer and naiver the belief the more devastating the doubt once it begins to dawn. (Jung 1970b, p. 200). The word doubt ultimately comes from the Latin word dubitare which means "to hesitate, waver in opinion" and originally meant "to have to choose between two things." The implicit sense of choice is reflected in the German word for doubt namely zweifel "doubt," which comes from the root zwei which means "two". Doubt arises from uncertainty and the difficulty of choosing "between", which must necessarily relate to something still in some way covered. Knowledge in contrast, arises from the certainty created from something being uncovered, and the rendering of choice as unnecessary.
The subjective association of doubt with belief stands in opposition to the objective association of certainty with knowledge. Clearly, as human beings we know much less than we believe, and perhaps we should assert much less than we do. As Aniela Jaffe suggests 'every answer is a human interpretation, a conjecture, a confession or belief. It is created by consciousness, and its formulation is a myth' (Jaffe 1971, p. 141).
Perhaps we only see through a mirror dimly.
Sources:
Jaffe, A. 1971, The Myth of Meaning, trans. Hull, R. F. C., G P Putnam's Sons, New York
Jung, C. G. 1964a, Civilization in Transition, Bollingen Series, vol. 10, trans. Baynes, H. G., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Jung, C. G. 1970b, Psychology and Religion : West and East, Bollingen Series XX, vol. 11, Read, H., Fordham, M. et al (eds), trans. Hull, R. F. C., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Jung, C. G. 1973b, C G Jung Letters, vol. 2, Adler, G. (ed), trans. Hull, R. F. C., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
McGuire, W. & Hull, R. F. C. (eds) 1977, C G Jung Speaking: Interviews and Encounters, Princeton University Press, Princeton.